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AbstrAct: it is shown that time may be appreciated in at least two senses: chronological and dynamical. 
Chronological time is the time of our naïve acquaintance as transient beings. at its most extensive scale, it 
corresponds to history encompassing both the abiotic and the biotic  universe. dynamical time, deriving 
from classical mechanics, is the time embraced by most of the laws of physics. it concerns itself only with 
present conditions since it is held that that the past may be reconstructed from the present (literally) and the 
future predicted from the present, a position known as laplacian determinism. 
nonlinear dynamics has shown the fallacy of this supposition: the concrete values that may be 
assumed in the variables of the equations of motion constituting the laws of physics (what are known 
as present or starting conditions) as a result of the spontaneous or intentional interaction of subject or 
measuring systems and of object or measured systems cannot be of infinite precision. indeed, even if they 
could be, it is not at all clear that they would permit laplacian determinism because of what is thought to 
be the ubiquity of K-flow dynamics in nature in which even infinite past information leading to the present 
cannot yield prediction of the future. in consequence, nonlinear dynamics, in rebellion against dynamical 
time, generates a primitive form of history distinguishing past, present, and future that may be termed 
nonlinear dynamical hysteresis. 
When nonlinear dynamics came to be complemented with semiotic modulation through the implement 
of symbol-mediated language (a complementation subsequently termed semantic closure) as first instantiated 
through the communicating as opposed  to the merely dynamically interacting molecular complexes of 
the cell, what can be termed semiotic hysteresis was born. the paper attempts to show that indefinitely 
evolving complexity, sustainability, justice, and meaning are indissolubly bound with chronological time in 
the sense of semiotic hysteresis (i.e. non-cognitive semantic closure first instantiated in the cell developing 
into cognitive semantic closure in human society): this semiotic hysteresis yields the indefinite evolutionary 
time of the living condition—including culture.
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justice; meaning
1. introduCtion
the nobel laureate in literature, henri bergson, famously argued that the role of time 
in nature is to prevent the simultaneous incidence of all events.1 he viewed time as a 
     1. ilya prigogine, The End of  Certainty: Time, Chaos, and the New Laws of   Nature, new york: the Free press, 1996, p.14.
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“vehicle of creativity and choice”. the distinction between dynamical and chronological 
time bears out bergson in this assertion. dynamical time is the time embraced by most 
of the laws of physics. it originally derives from the oldest branch of physics—classical 
mechanics. it is not the irrevocable time of our naïve experience in which irrevocable 
choices, whether intentionally or not, are made. rather it is what may be termed an 
“indifferent time interval”—a time interval devoid of qualitative variation or significance. 
Classical mechanics makes a similar substitution in the spatial dimension: the “location” 
of human experience is replaced by “indifferent distance”—a spatial extension devoid of 
qualitative variation or significance.2 
how inimical to complexity the indifferent time interval and indifferent distance of 
classical mechanics are is rhetorically impressed upon us by the applied mathematician, 
ian Stewart , as follows: 
if the laws of physics are the same for all places and at all times, why is there any 
‘interesting’ structure in the universe at all? Should it not be homogeneous and 
changeless? if every place in the universe were interchangeable with every other 
place, then all places would be indistinguishable; and the same would hold for all 
times. … the problem is, if anything, made worse by the cosmological theory that 
the universe began as a single point, which exploded from nothingness billions of 
years ago in the big bang. at the instant of the universe’s formation, all places and 
all times were not only indistinguishable but identical.3
the indifferent time interval or dynamical time of classical mechanics is responsi-
ble for the philosophical position called laplacian determinism—that the distinction 
between past, present and future is illusory because both the past and the future are 
already implicit in the present. more precisely, the past may be reconstructed, literally, 
from the present and the future predicted or constructed from the present. the past and 
the future may therefore be collapsed upon the present into a timeless, non-actualized 
potential. hence, the homogeneity or identity Stewart speaks of above.
nonlinear dynamics has disclosed the fallacy of laplacian determinism. laplacian de-
terminism, nonlinear dynamics instructs us, can only be upheld if the present or starting con-
ditions (i.e. the values of the variables in the equations of motion by which the laws of phys-
ics are expressed) are specified with infinite precision. indeed, it is not at all clear that even 
infinite precision in the specification of starting conditions would suffice to uphold laplacian 
determinism because of what is thought to be the ubiquity of K-flow dynamics in nature in 
which even infinite past observations leading to the present fail to predict the future.4
the specification  of starting conditions adverted to above transpires in what physicists call 
the measurement process.  this process may be contrived in the laboratory, as when scientists 
are checking out a new detecting instrument sensitive to some aspect of the universe hitherto 
     2. nicholas georgescu-roegen, The Entropy Law and the Economic Process. Cambridge, massachusetts: 
harvard university press, 1971, p. 96.
     3. ian Stewart, Nature’s Numbers: Discovering Order and Pattern in the Universe, london: Weidenfeld and 
nicolson,1995, pp.84-85.
     4. John l. Casti, Complexification: Explaining a Paradoxical World Through the Science of  Surprise, new york: 
harperperrenial, 1995 [1994], pp. 287-288.  See also prigogine, The End of  Certainty, pp. 105-106.
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unobservable; or when, for some reason, calculation from first principles is impossible and only 
experimental  measure will yield the relevant starting conditions; hence the origin of the term 
“measurement”. alternatively, the process may spontaneously occur in nature. in the process, 
a subject or measuring system selects particular dynamics for propagation from an object or 
measured system.5 the selection is implemented through what are called, in physics, as bound-
ary conditions; or more complicated boundary constraints (i.e. the range of admissible values to 
the variables at issue). the subject system selects a particular dynamic from the object system 
for expression in itself as a record in a material structure, such as a gene; or as a modulated 
action, such as enzyme catalysis.6 For the boundary constraint exerted by the subject system 
to be able to discharge its selective function, however, it is required that it lie outside the de-
scriptive embrace of physical law. this is not to say that it is beyond such embrace  (at least, for 
finite measurement precisions). it is only to say that if one insists on such an embrace, then the 
boundary constraint will forfeit its ability to discharge the measurement function and another 
boundary constraint not within the descriptive embrace of physical law must be brought in.7
the subject and object systems involved in the measurement process, if they are not al-
ready present from a prior act of measurement, may be created during the measurement proc-
ess itself; in which case, measurement is more accurately termed a bifurcation.8 measurements 
and bifurcations arise from instabilities (further explained below) defying the prediction of the 
laws of physics. in the case of the subject system, for example, consider the radiation process: 
this process can only transpire when the radiation sources (technically, the material oscillators) 
have succeeded in creating the necessary selecting environment (technically, the field oscilla-
tors) which will propagate radiation. there is a pause preceding this creative process that is not 
explained by the relevant equation describing the dynamics involved.9
instability, as described above, transpires because the concrete or particular values as-
signed to variables in the laws of physics by natural or intentional processes  are not and cannot, 
for finite beings in the observable universe, be of infinite precision; indeed, even infinite preci-
sion may, as described above in connection with nonlinear dynamics, be unavailing to prevent 
instability. einstein, in effect, succinctly summarized this state of affairs when he said: “‘insofar 
as the propositions of mathematics are certain, they do not refer to reality; and insofar as they 
refer to reality, they are not certain.’”10 instability implies that, in both classical and quantum 
physics, “events” independent of laws (i.e. not predicted by laws) are necessary if we are able 
to account for the observable universe.11 the events adverted to may be identified with the 
     5. howard h. pattee, “the physics of Symbols: bridging the epistemic Cut,” Biosystems,  60 (2001): 5-21, pp. 15, 19.
     6. h. h. pattee, “Simulations, realizations, and theories of life,” in: Artificial Life: SFI Studies in the Sciences 
of  Complexity, langton, C. (ed), boston: addison-Wesley publishing Company, (1988): 63-77, pp. 73-74.
     7. See pattee, “the physics of Symbols”, p. 15.
     8. See prigogine, The End of  Certainty, p. 69.
     9. gregoire nicolis and  ilya prigogine, Exploring Complexity: An Introduction, new york: W. h Freeman and 
Company, 1989, p. 214.
     10. h. h. pattee, “the limitations of Formal models of measurement, Control and Cognition.”  Applied 
Mathematics and Computation,  56 (1993):  111-130,  p.121. in this cited reference for the quote in the manuscript, 
the word “truth” is used instead of the word “certain”. pattee informs me in a personal communication that 
it should be the latter. accordingly, the quote as it appears in the text.
     11. See prigogine, The End of  Certainty, p.5.
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contingent emergence and selective effects of boundary constraints and attest to the dictum 
of nonlinear dynamics that the whole is greater than the sum of the parts, over chronological 
time. the implication is that, for sufficiently complex systems, it is indeed possible to exercise 
ethical choice, initially at least, through the collective or macro-level imposition of selective 
boundary constraints on dynamics embracing the indefinite future. the embrace of the indefi-
nite future in the imposed macro-level boundary constraint is necessary if ethical choice is at 
all to be made since the demands of the indefinite future act as a filter against the simultaneous 
incidence of all choices. once the macro-level boundary constraint (which may be seen as a 
selecting environment) has been imposed, nothing prevents the exercise of ethical choice at the 
individual or micro-level. 
the  significance of the measurement process should be underscored: prior to the meas-
urement process in physics, the laws of physics are in a sort of timeless limbo without actual 
contact with what would be the observable universe.12 that is to say (to echo bergson), physi-
cal laws are so general of application (they represent the simultaneous incidence of all events 
within their descriptive embrace) that they find no particular application unless and until the 
measurement process selects a particular dynamic permitted by them for propagation in the 
actual universe. 
because of measurement and the consequent intrusion of nonlinear dynamics into mere 
linear or deterministic dynamics  (or should it be the other way around?), chronological time 
is generated through a primitive history that may be termed nonlinear dynamical hysteresis. 
more precisely,  when the imposed boundary constraint in the measurement process is suf-
ficiently strong to permit several selections from the same parameter values in the boundary 
constraint such that chance alone determines the selection  of particular dynamics for propa-
gation (i.e. the selection of dynamics is not determined by physical law), then the “system is 
imbued with a historical dimension in the sense of a critical event that will influence subse-
quent system behavior. Such historically determined behavior is called [nonlinear dynamical] 
hysteresis”.13
nonlinear dynamical hysteresis, while it is necessary, does not suffice to generate the type 
of chronological time that fosters the indefinite evolution that characterizes the living condi-
tion. as prigogine (who has done the most in elucidating how what we have termed nonlinear 
dynamical hysteresis is generated) instructs us:
irreversibility, and therefore the flow of time, starts at the dynamical [micro- 
or individual] level. it is amplified at the macroscopic level, then at the level of 
life, and finally at the level of human activity. What drove these transitions from 
one level to the next remains largely unknown, but at least we have achieved 
a noncontradictory description of nature rooted in dynamical instability. the 
descriptions of nature presented by biology and physics begin to converge.14 
that convergence was consummated in successful bridging through the emergence 
of symbol-mediated boundary constraints complementing nonlinear dynamics as first 
     12. prigogine, The End of  Certainty, p.157.
     13. See nicolis and  prigogine, Exploring Complexity: An Introduction, pp. 14-24.
     14. prigogine, The End of  Certainty, p. 162.
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instantiated  in the cell. as the fundamental example, consider protein synthesis: genes 
only specify the linear sequence of amino acids constituting proteins. how these linear 
sequences then subsequently fold into three-dimensional conformations to confer the 
specific functional properties of proteins relies on complicated nonlinear dynamics not 
specified  by the gene but rather resulting from attractions and repulsions between 
chemical bonds in the amino acid sequences and the chemical bonds in the environ-
ment of those sequences. this complementation of symbols and nonlinear dynamics in 
the living condition has been termed semantic closure in theoretical biology.
2. SemantiC CloSure and indeFinitely eVolVing Complexity
What is it that distinguishes complexity in the living domain from complexity in the non-liv-
ing domain? in a seminal study initially ventilated through a lecture in 1948, the mathemati-
cian, John von neumann, informed us that complexity in the living domain, with its ability 
to indefinitely evolve (a capacity not observed in complexity in the non-living domain), must 
involve the complementation of syntax or symbol manipulation and semantics in the form 
of  nonlinear dynamics. this complementation, termed semantic closure, developed and 
evolved from the measurement process in physics.15 the syntax involves molecules or other 
material structures invested with symbolic or linguistic significance serving as boundary con-
straints  and capable of copying or transmission, without interpretation; and the semantics 
involves the dynamical selections of the  boundary constraint and the subsequent interpreta-
tion of the constraint through the propagation of the dynamics, which propagation consider-
ably augments the extremely limited information in the boundary constraint.16 
We have already noted above the complementation of syntax and semantics in protein 
synthesis. this same complementation of syntax and semantics is observed at higher levels 
of aggregation, such as ribosomes, microtubules, membranes.17 through this complementa-
tion, semantic closure is able to manage complexity through resort to dynamical semantics 
that would defeat syntactic manipulations alone as disclosed by the preponderance of non-
computable real-world problems that defeat digital computers; further, through successive 
syntactic selections, to cumulatively evolve that complexity over time. as pattee amplifies of 
this latter point: “at higher evolutionary levels, the products of genes can become symbol 
tokens themselves within semantically closed epigenetic [i.e. developmental] loops.”18
the semiotic or message conveying nature as opposed to the dynamical nature of the 
     15. howard h. pattee, “evolving Self-reference: matter, Symbols, and Semantic Closure”, Communication 
and Cognition—Artificial Intelligence: The Journal for the Integrated Study of  Artificial Intelligence, Cognitive Science, and 
Applied Epistemology, 12 (1995): 9-27, pp. 10-11, 3.
     16. h.h. pattee, “Causation, Control, and the evolution of Complexity,” in: Downward Causation, p. b. 
anderson, p. V. Christiansen, C. emmeche. n. o. Finnemann (editors), aarhus: aarhus university press, 
(2000) [1997]:  , p.71; John l. Casti,  Complexification: Explaining a Paradoxical World Through the Science of  Surprise, 
new york: harperperrenial, 1995 [1994], pp. 221-223.
     17. howard h. pattee, “Cell psychology: an evolutionary approach to the Symbol-matter problem”, 
Cognition  and Brain Theory, 5 (1982): 325-341, p.333.
     18. pattee, “Cell psychology: an evolutionary approach to the Symbol-matter problem”, p.339.
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complexity wrought by semantic closure should be emphasized.19 the complementation of 
syntax and semantics means that we are dealing with “records, codes, signals, and messages” 
rather than mere dynamical interactions. this ability of semantic closure to convey mes-
sages embodied in the living condition reposes on the fact of the dialectical disjunction and 
continuity of syntax and semantics: the syntax, by avoiding complete microscopic descrip-
tion (which is beyond its ability anyway as revealed by the seminal investigations of turing in 
computation theory) and resorting to dynamical elaboration (as when syntax only specifies 
the linear sequence of amino acids and leaves the semantic of sequence folding into func-
tional proteins to nonlinear dynamics), means that the consequent semantic closure achieves 
a non-tautological description. Such non-tautological description is a requirement of infor-
mation theory and symbolic dynamics if meaningful messages are to be at all possible. We 
shall see this point elaborated in our discussion of meaning below. 
the peculiarity of this semiotic description to the living condition, with its ability to yield 
simplification of results into intelligibility and relevance (e.g. syntax leading to a computa-
tionally intractable crevasse of nonlinear dynamics leading to a functional protein)  must be 
contrasted to the dynamical description championed by mainstream physicists and their 
adherents: in physics, an opposite trend is observed—the ubiquity of the simplest possible 
problems in the nonliving domain that produce such complicated results that the physicist 
must content himself with mere statistical descriptions forsaking all individual details. 
Several properties of the symbolic boundary constraints in semantic closure make them 
naturally suited to embrace chronological time and indeed refine it beyond nonlinear dy-
namical hysteresis, to yield semiotic hysteresis. one of that property is, of course, memory: 
genes (collectively, the genotype) afford the reproducibility, with slight modification, of their 
complementary nonlinear dynamics in the phenotype (i.e. the physical and behavioural 
characteristics)  of the organism. that the phenotype is nonlinear dynamical in character 
explains why species with minimal differences  in genotype (e.g. chimps and humans) can 
nonetheless display vast differences in attainments. that the changes in phenotype are also 
dialectically slight is the reason why the emergence of one species from another is difficult 
to discern, even in retrospect.  Contrast this with the dramatic and non-equivocal character 
of emergence in simple nonlinear dynamical hysteresis, such as the fracture of a beam. in 
beam fracture, the cumulative production of “precursor structures of fracture” due to stress 
concentrators from imperfections in the three-dimensional molecular or atomic disposition 
of the bulk material, means that the repeated application of even an ostensibly safe load (way 
below the theoretical tolerance of the material in question if imperfections of molecular or 
atomic disposition in space were prevented, which they cannot be because this would take 
infinite time) must eventually yield to complete structural failure in the bulk material.
another property of symbolic boundary constraints in semantic closure that lends itself to the 
embrace of chronological time is that of linguistic displacement: an alteration in a gene, for exam-
ple, may presently have neutral effects. (most alterations, however, have lethal effects.) millions of 
years hence, it may be found to have a selective effect for survival in a novel environment.
     19. howard h. pattee, “how does a molecule become a message?” Developmental Biology Supplement, 3 
(1969): 1-16.
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linguistic displacement exhibits the power of the living condition to couple itself  with 
the indefinite time horizon that nonlinear dynamics demands: nonlinear dynamics’ dictum 
that whole is greater than the sum of the parts means that the long-term cannot be built 
from the mere addition of the short-term. accordingly, the long-term, macro-level goal or 
choice must, by intention, through cognitive semantic closure; or  by inadvertence, through 
non-cognitive semantic closure, be imposed at the outset if the addition of short-term , mi-
cro-level, individual choices is to have a benign, let alone a prosperous conclusion.
in the evolution of life on the planet, the embrace of the indefinite future was achieved 
by non-cognitive semantic closure through bacterial intervention operating through epige-
netic loops. the reference being made here is to the planetary superorganism termed gaia 
by lovelock.20[20]  as lovelock has argued with great persuasion,  it is only because of 
bacterial activity on a planetary scale that conditions hospitable to life have been preserved 
for and beyond the 3 billion years in which only bacteria and archea (another group of sin-
gle-celled organisms) were the only living organisms on the planet. if bacterial activity had 
been absent and what we have identified as non-cognitive semantic closure had not been in 
operation through epigenetic loops, the planet would have evolved solely according to the 
equilibrium laws of physics and chemistry. in that case, all possible chemical reactions capa-
ble of transpiring from micro-level interactions would have done so. We would then expect 
the predominance, in our atmosphere, for example, of  equilibrium gases of a generally 
non-reactive nature, such as carbon dioxide (which is in fact the case for mars and Venus). 
instead, we find gases that react with one another, such as oxygen and methane, co-existing 
indefinitely. this argues the intervention of life in preserving  conditions hospitable to life (i.e. 
non-cognitive semantic closure). 
this conclusion is at variance with mainstream, neo-darwinian evolutionary biology, 
which takes the hospitability of the environment to life as a given. accordingly, lovelock 
points out, the neo-darwinians have been the most vigorous objectors to his gaia concept. 
lovelock cites the example of the prominent, if not pre-eminent, neo-darwinian, richard 
dawkins, who “[i]n his second book, The Extended Phenotype”, attempted to quash the gaia 
concept by arguing that genes could never express themselves on a planetary scale. love-
lock objects, however, that genes, through the mediation of the cell membrane, can in fact 
express themselves on a planetary scale: the necessity of keeping the cell membrane intact 
means that the biochemistry selected for propagation by genes and which reciprocally con-
siderably augment the information content of the genes to a level of complexity  beyond 
their own must, on pain of extinction, result in extracellular metabolites which operate to 
adjust environmental conditions towards compatibility with the cell membrane. those en-
vironmental conditions as regards, say, “temperature, salinity, acidity, redox potential, water 
availability”, are extremely restrictive in their range and it is exceedingly unlikely, if the equi-
librium laws of physics and chemistry alone were in effect, that they would have persisted in 
the far-from-equilibrium ranges that they have.
For example, without the action of hydrogen-sequestering bacteria that metabolize hy-
     20. James lovelock,  Healing Gaia: Practical Medicine  for the Planet, new york: harmony books, 1991, pp. 
21-22, 79-83, 95-101,  130.
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drogen sulphide to sustain themselves; and without the oxygen generated by photosynthe-
sizing bacteria that then combine with available atmospheric hydrogen afforded by the hy-
drogen-sulphide bacteria, hydrogen liberated from the reaction of water with rocks in the 
presence of carbon dioxide would, in a period of 1 or 2 billion years, have effectively caused 
the depletion of all ocean waters through eventual escape of hydrogen into space. Fortunate-
ly, because of bacterial intervention beginning in the archean eon (spanning 3.7 to 2.5 billion 
years ago) and continuing to this day, calamities of this sort have been averted. Furthermore, 
they have been averted, contrary to the neo-darwinian assertion that competition is the pri-
mary organizing principle for the evolution of life, through cooperative communities of bac-
terial mats on lagoons or as communities on rocky substrates that were being transformed 
into structures called stromatolites (some of them the size of houses).  the cooperation in-
volved, it must be emphasized, was achieved, not by intention, but simply through chemical 
signals and the selective effects of those signal in fostering survival or not.
Such bacterial communities are still around and constitute the basal steps towards epi-
genesis that includes endosymbiotic evolution. endosymbiotic evolution, deriving from the 
work of margulis, argues that the evolution of complexity in the biosphere has proceeded 
from the symbiotic assimilation of formerly autonomous bacteria in ever more complex 
structures. dawkins, neo-darwinian though he is, informs us that this endosymbiotic theory 
for the evolution of complexity in the biosphere is now almost universally accepted by biolo-
gists. he describes the result of that evolution as follows:
each one of us is a community of a hundred million million mutually dependent 
eukaryotic cells. each one of those cells is a community of thousands of specially 
tamed bacteria, entirely enclosed  within the cell … a single animal or plant is a 
vast community of communities, packed in interacting layers, like a rain forest. as 
for a rain forest itself, it is a community seething, with perhaps ten million species 
of organisms, every individual member of every species being itself a community 
of communities of domesticated bacteria.21
So we see that without non-cognitive semantic closure operating through epige-
netic loops  embracing the indefinite future (at least, approximately or effectively so, as 
we shall see in the next section) through the maintenance of the restrictive, far-from-
equilibrium conditions compatible with the cell membrane, life on earth would have 
not progressed beyond the bacterial stage before coming to an end. Semantic closure, 
cognitive or otherwise, is required, as von neumann effectively argued (the concept of 
semantic closure was a subsequent distillation and elaboration from the work of von 
neumann by pattee), if complexity is to indefinitely evolve through semiotic hysteresis 
in what we have come to distinguish as life.
3. SuStainability and CognitiVe SemantiC CloSure
in this section, we shall inquire why it is that cognitive semantic closure will be necessary if 
true sustainability is to be possible (again through semiotic hysteresis) beyond what even non-
     21. richard dawkins, River Out of  Eden: A Darwinian View of  Life, london: phoenix, 1996 [1995], p. 52.
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cognitive semantic closure can manage. to see the necessity of cognitive semantic closure on 
first instance, it might be well to reflect on why it is that human culture has apparently been so 
destructive to the ability of this planet to support life. as the most direct demonstration of this 
assertion, consider that human activity (i.e. through habitat clearing, habitat fragmentation, 
unsustainable harvesting, pollution, introduction of alien species) has raised the background 
rate of extinction by ten thousand percent. this development qualifies then as the sixth great 
mass extinction episode to be suffered by the planetary biota. Certainly not helping in this 
regard is anthropogenic or human-induced climate warming resulting from the fact that we 
are liquidating geologic capital, in the form of fossil fuels, in a matter of centuries whereas the 
accumulation of that capital (representing the sequestration of heat-trapping carbon dioxide) 
transpired over hundreds of millions of years.
this destructive state of affairs may be readily ascribed, in light of the preceding discussion, 
to predominance of mainstream, neoclassical economics in the government of our affairs: neo-
classical economics was explicitly intended by its originators to be the equivalent, in the behav-
ioral sciences, of classical mechanics in physics.22 accordingly, it instructs human affairs with 
dynamical time. that is to say, only with present conditions. it secures that only present condi-
tions govern human affairs through deliberately adopted temporal myopia achieved through 
such practices as ceteris paribus (latin for “all other things being equal”) assumptions that are 
then used to prop up a spurious pseudo-dynamics (i.e. spurious because the conserved quan-
tity is not identified as it is in, say, hamiltonian dynamics in physics in which energy is the con-
served quantity);23 the “by-gones” principle that counsels that only the balance between immedi-
ate future costs and benefits, with benefits outweighing costs, should determine whether or not 
a project should go on;24 and by discounting.25 
the by-gones principle of economics, by effectively ignoring the cumulative costs of our ac-
tions, renders the economic process ahistorical, an isolated cycle of production and consump-
tion that neither induces qualitative change in the environment in which it is embedded nor is 
affected by qualitative change in that environment.26  discounting is the inverse compound in-
terest calculation to determine whether or not to invest in a project or simply put money in the 
bank. its effect is to contract time horizon of consideration because of exponential increase of 
inverse compound interest (i.e. the successive sums to be added quickly approach zero), thereby 
militating against investments in sustainability. a rationale often urged for upholding the tem-
poral myopia secured by discounting is risk aversion. thus, for example, it is often the case that 
loggers would rather harvest trees and place the revenues in the bank to earn interest because 
of fear from risk of, say, disease wiping out the trees or a logging ban preventing their harvest-
ing. this temporal myopia fostered by discounting, ceteris paribus assumptions, the by-gones 
principle, and by risk aversion  is enforced by market competition and deliberately chosen in 
     22. See georgescu-roegen, The Entropy Law, pp. 1. 318, 320.
     23. philip mirowski, “From mandelbrot to Chaos in economic theory”, Southern Economic Journal, 57 
(1991): 289-307, p. 290.
     24. paul Samuelson and William d. nordhaus, Economics. new york: mcgraw-hill, 1989, pp. 581-582.
     25. herman e. daly and John b. Cobb, Jr., For the Common Good: Redirecting the Economy Toward Community, 
the Environment and a Sustainable Future, boston: beacon press, 1989, pp. 152-154.
     26. georgescu-roegen, The Entropy Law, p. 2.
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cost-benefit analysis (i.e. to secure analytic tractability by eliminating increasing uncertainty, 
with chronologic time). the irony of this latter observation should be savored: cost-benefit 
analysis was precisely originated to correct for the market’s temporal myopia!
how inimical to complexity the government of human affairs by present conditions alone 
or what is effectively dynamical time secured through temporal myopia is may be appreciated 
as follows: temporal myopia militates against sustainable logging because agriculture yields 
quicker, more reliable, less risky returns to investment. by precisely the same reasoning, agri-
culture yields to manufacturing. in the same way, manufacturing gives way to speculative and 
financial institutions. the present financial crises shows in no uncertain terms how ultimately 
destructive dynamical time or government by present conditions or temporal myopia is: even 
the abstract exchange value represented by money (as opposed to the concrete use value it pur-
chases) is destroyed (e.g. the failure of financial institutions) by unrestricted pre-occupation with 
short-term gain authorized by instruction from present conditions or dynamical time alone. 
accordingly, the necessity of instructing the economic process with chronological time.
as with non-cognitive semantic closure, the aim is to institute semiotic hysteresis and 
permit gradual evolution by supplanting the non-graduated qualitative transitions yielded by 
nonlinear dynamical hysteresis. as with non-cognitive semantic closure, to do this, we want to 
impose symbol-mediated boundary constraints embracing the indefinite future (in recogni-
tion of the fact that nonlinear dynamics decrees the whole to be greater than the sum of the 
parts) and which permit the reproducibility of nonlinear dynamics, with slight variations, as in 
the phenotype. in non-cognitive semantic closure, we saw that this embrace of the indefinite 
future was achieved, initially and primarily still, by cooperative bacterial intervention within 
epigenetic loops on a global or macro-level. this macro-level intervention preserves condi-
tions hospitable to the cell membrane through the appropriate extracellular metabolites. in 
cognitive semantic closure, the same intervention must be effected through public policy and 
the appropriate implementing social institutions. the public policy concerned is sustainability 
and its implementing social institutions (at least, the minimum ones) are daly’s institutions for 
a steady-state economy.
before we discuss those institutions, it might be well to digress a bit on how dynamical and 
chronological time affect the notion of sustainability as conceived by neoclassical economists 
(who champion the former) and ecological economists (who champion the latter). the neoclas-
sical economist’s notion of sustainability may be termed weak sustainability. this notion asserts 
that natural capital  and man-made capital  are substitutes rather than complements. they 
are qualitatively homogeneous rather than qualitatively heterogeneous. natural capital (such 
as petrol) may therefore be completely converted to man-made capital (such as automobiles). 
the ecological economist’s notion of sustainability is that of strong sustainability. this notion 
asserts that natural and man-made capital are complements rather than substitutes. they are 
qualitatively heterogeneous rather than qualitatively homogeneous. accordingly, natural capi-
tal cannot be completely converted to man-made capital. rather, quantitative restrictions or 
boundary constraints must be imposed to preserve the qualitative heterogeneity and conse-
quent functional complementarity between them. 
the untenability, if not absurdity, of weak sustainability as opposed to strong sustainability 
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is elaborated by daly as follows:
man-made capital (along with labor) is an agent of transformation of the resource flow 
from raw material inputs into product outputs. the natural resource flow (and the 
natural capital stock that generates it) are the material cause of production; the capital 
stock that transforms raw material inputs into product output is the efficient cause of 
production. one cannot substitute efficient cause for material cause—one cannot build 
the same wooden house with half the timber no matter how many saws and carpenters 
one tries to substitute. also, to process more timber into wooden houses in the same 
time period requires more saws and carpenters. Clearly the basic relation of man-made 
and natural capital is one of complementarity, not substitutability. of course, one could 
substitute bricks for timber, but that is the substitution of one resource input for another, 
not the substitution of [man-made] capital for resources. in making a brick house one 
would face the analogous inability of trowels and masons to substitute for bricks.27
if it is granted that natural resources and man-made capital are complements, then the 
question of time horizon in the serviceability of resources cannot be avoided. in this respect, 
beckerman  writes:
… Clearly, resources are either finite or they are not. if they are, then the only way to 
ensure their continuation in perpetuity is to stop using them. Stopping growth is not 
enough. levels of consumption would have to be reduced to infinitesimal levels if finite 
resources are to be made to last forever.28
accordingly, beckerman concludes that an indefinite time horizon for resource use must be 
rejected and be reconciled with more pressing demands not instructed by the indefinite future. 
he recommends project-level sustainability “over the economically optimal period”.29 in other 
words, the indefinite future is to be built piecemeal rather than it governing what we should be 
doing in the short-term, as nonlinear dynamics demands if the short-term is to be compatible 
with the long-term.
georgescu-roegen put it well when he wrote:
the claim  that standard economics is not concerned ‘with very long-run projections, 
but rather with the immediate future’, is another means of avoiding the main issue that 
would incriminate the standard position. the problem of resources is not confined to 
the ‘forseeable future’, as many writers also insist, but concerns the entire future …. 
if the standard postion concerns only what will happen to natural resources ‘in the 
immediate future’ of this moment of the twentieth century, then all the din about how 
the market mechanism (especially that moulded on standard assumptions) can save us 
from ecological catastrophe is utterly idle. but if the claim is that exponential growth can 
prevail not only in our immediate future but also in any ‘immediate future’ in the future, 
then the claim acquires a factual, non-parochial significance.30
     27. herman e. daly, Beyond Growth: The Economics of  Sustainable Development, boston: beacon press, 1996, 
pp. 76-78.
     28. Wilfrid beckerman, “economic development and the environment: Conflict or Complementarity?”, 
policy research Working paper, report no. WpS961, Volume no. 1, 1992, p.  26. (a background paper for 
the World development report 1992 of the World bank.)
     29. beckerman, “economic development and the environment: Conflict or Complementarity?”, p.30.
     30. nicholas georgescu-roegen, “Comments on the papers by daly and Stiglitz, in: V. Kerry Smith (ed), 
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if the indefinite future is to govern our resource use, however, then cognitive semantic closure 
demands selective boundary constraints incorporating values expressed as public policy and 
implemented through social institutions explicitly embracing the indefinite future be imposed 
at the outset.  thus, the value of sustainability has been enunciated as meeting the needs of the 
present without compromising the needs of the future. a strong element of justice as fairness is 
clearly involved with the notion of sustainability. We shall amplify upon the notion of justice as 
fairness in the next section and how chronological time, through historical contingency, bears 
upon it.
if the indefinite future or an infinite time horizon is to govern our short-term actions in 
society as concerns resource mobilization, however, a problem arises: due to the fact that at 
any given time the resources available to us as a society of finite beings is finite (the emphasis is 
made because what is rational from an individual vantage point, such as discounting, is often 
not rational from the collective vantage point, e.g. while individuals are mortal, collectives can 
be quasi-immortal), georgescu-roegen points out that this would mean (as also pointed out 
by beckerman), over an infinite time horizon, that a null amount of resources would have to 
be “used”.31 to circumvent this paradoxical result, what needs to be done then is to spread 
resources evenly in time to secure the longest life-span for the species. the physics of how to 
secure this aim has apparently been afforded us by dyson.32
the key to securing the longest life span for the species, despite the fact that at any given 
time the available resources to the species is finite, is to vary the schedule of resource mobiliza-
tion such that it observes a pulsing mode. that is to say, we want resource mobilization to be 
suspended altogether in what may be termed as periods of stasis, with these periods of stasis 
being allowed to lengthen without bound. in these periods of stasis, we follow the lead of nature 
by going to seed, as it were:  We store the information for modulating resource mobilization in 
the next cycle of existence in non-resource-dissipating equilibrium or quasi-equilibrium struc-
tures, such as seeds, spores, or crystals. if we follow such a resource mobilization regime, then 
dyson’s calculations show that even a finite amount of resources would suffice for a virtual in-
finity of time in sustaining the species. For example, dyson showed that, if only energy mat-
tered, then solar output for a mere eight hours would suffice for literally eternity to support a 
population of the order of magnitude that presently subsists on this planet.
the hindrance to achieving an actual infinity of time is the fact that matter decays to 
energy over illimitable, chronological time. thus, even black holes evaporate through hawk-
ing radiation. ultimately, it is thought that the only recently discovered cosmological-scale phe-
nomenon called dark energy will rip apart all material configurations down to the sub-atomic 
scale. the only solace to this depressing conclusion is the possibility of further cycles of exist-
ence due to the possibility, if not probability, that energy is a “bottomless ocean of which we 
can observe effectively only the waves on its surface.”33 if so, this is tantamount to finding new 
Scarcity and Growth Reconsidered, baltimore: rfF and Johns hopkins university press (1979): 95-105, p. 96.
     31. georgescu-roegen, “Comments on the papers by daly and Stiglitz,, pp.101-102.
     32. Freeman dyson, “time without end: physics and biology in an open universe”, Reviews of  Modern 
Physics 51 (1979): 447-460.
     33. See georgescu-roegen, The Entropy Law, p. 138.
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particles of matter, with novel properties, however deep we plumb that ocean.34
What would be the quality of life afforded in dyson’s resource mobilization regime? Sur-
prisingly, the quality of life possible in dyson’s resource mobilization regime need not be bound-
ed by any upper limit (excepting only the limit imposed by matter decay) precisely because 
there is a distinction between quality and quantity (supposing quantitative restrictions are able 
to preserve qualitative heterogeneity).35 Such a distinction between quality and quantity has in 
fact been urged upon economic policy by boulding.36 boulding argued that since it is from the 
capital stock that we derive our satisfactions from, not from the additions to it (production) or 
from the subtractions from it (consumption), the object of economic policy should be to mini-
mize production or consumption. otherwise, if we were to maximize either, the maintenance 
cost of the capital stock would also be maximized.
 So much for the physics of sustainability. as to the economics of the implementation of this 
physics (at least at a minimum level), mention has already been made of daly’s institutions for 
a steady-state economy (SSe). these include an institution for controlling resource inflows into 
the economy; one for controlling income differentials; one for controlling population.37 the ne-
cessity for a social institution controlling income differentials shall be discussed at greater length 
in the next section. Suffice it to say in this section, its necessity is indicated because, among 
other things, the institution for controlling resource inflows into society uses implements that 
actually amount to a regressive tax that hits the poor harder than it does the rich.
one such implement that is completely acceptable to daly for servicing a SSe is the present 
cap-and-trade system in carbon dioxide emissions. the idea of the cap-and-trade system is 
that a limit to permissible carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuel use is imposed at the outset 
and this limit is translated into permits to pollute which are then auctioned off to users of fossil 
fuels (in the main, corporations). the revenues from the auctioning of the permits constitute 
public revenue and may be used to offset the regressive nature of the permits through govern-
ment transfer payments. (the regressive nature of the permits arises from the probability that 
the corporations may shift some of the costs, at least, to consumers of their products, e.g. elec-
tricity bills) over time, the limit to permissible carbon dioxide emissions would be contracted 
towards compatibility with ecological tolerances. the consequent rise in fuel prices would then 
provide market incentive for more efficient industrial processes.
the cap-and-trade system was first realized in the european union (albeit, from what the 
author knows, without the auctioning of the permits, initially). the system need not be con-
fined to a continent, however. in a recent bbC debate (June or July 2009, if the author remem-
bers correctly), the author of this paper heard an academic from the lee Kuan yew School 
of public policy in Singapore talk of the necessity of a global cap-and-trade system in carbon 
dioxide emissions that would act as a conduit for transfer payments from rich to poor countries, 
not as a matter of mere pragmatism, but rather as a matter of entitlement and justice due to 
     34. John d. barrow, Theories of  Everything: The Quest for Ultimate Explanation, london: Vintage, 1992 [1991], 
pp 78, 85.
     35. dyson, “time without end: physics and biology in an open universe”,
     36. See daly, Beyond Growth, pp. 67-68.
     37. herman e. daly, Steady-State Economics, San Francisco: W. h. Freeman and Company, 1977, pp. 50-
75.
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the injustices inflicted by historical contingency (i.e. the rich countries are primarily responsible 
for global warming).
the cap-and-trade system as an implementing social institution of public policy is a good 
instance of cognitive semantic closure: it displays macro-level control reflective of a collec-
tive value (i.e. sustainability) incorporated through the total number of permits imposed at 
the outset in recognition of the fact that market prices, even when augmented by cost-benefit 
analysis, are unable to properly instruct micro-level control exerted by individuals in the mar-
ketplace. So the cap-and-trade system displays the complementation of macro- and micro-
level controls we have come to identify with semantic closure. the necessity of the macro-level 
control should be emphasized, however. in economic terms, this is due to the fact that market 
prices cannot incorporate the market bids of future generations, not even with the considered 
anticipations of economists performing cost-benefit analysis. accordingly, quantitative allot-
ments of resources must be availed of in the interest of justice as fairness, which fairness also has 
a salutary effect upon the present generation: it restrains that generation from making choices 
in dynamic time that, as discussed above, is so inimical to complexity and therefore, by exten-
sion, the continued possibility of life, let alone quality of life.
this is where dyson’s calculations naturally come in: dyson’s calculations, in effect, de-
mands that the entire sequence of generations possible to the human species should instruct 
the resource allocation for each generation in that sequence. as dyson’s calculations show, the 
time scales involved are virtually infinite. it may seem absurd that such scales of time should 
be involved in the instruction of economic policy. the author submits that it is not: the weak 
anthropic principle in cosmology articulates that the observable universe must exhibit certain 
properties if it is to contain living organisms. one such property has to do with chronological 
time: the universe must be of  a certain minimum age if it is to permit the evolution of life. For 
example, life is literally made from star-stuff: the debris of supernovae explosions incorporated 
into less violent star systems induced into existence by those same explosions. So we already 
know that prodigious amounts of time have been involved in preparing the stage for life. dy-
son’s calculations only show, in accord with the nonlinear dynamical dictum that the whole is 
greater than the sum of the parts, that the perpetuation of life (as was already approximated by 
non-cognitive semantic closure on this planet through bacterial intervention) also requires the 
embrace of an even more prodigious amount of time—the indefinite future in its entirety. 
historical time, in the sense of semiotic hysteresis, thus truly asserts its indissoluble linkage 
with the living condition and binds that condition with the fate of the universe and purpose. 
as dyson himself counsels:
it is impossible to calculate in detail the long-range future of the universe without 
including the effects of life and intelligence. it is impossible to calculate the capabilities of 
life and intelligence without touching, at least peripherally, philosophical questions. if we 
are to examine how intelligent life may be able to guide the physical development of the 
universe for its own purposes, we cannot altogether avoid considering what the values 
and purposes of intelligent life may be. …
if our analysis of the long-range future leads us to raise questions related to the ultimate 
meaning and purpose of life, then let us examine these questions boldly and without 
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embarrassment. if our answers to these questions are naive and preliminary, so much the 
better for the continued vitality of our science.38
if we therefore desire sustainability beyond even what non-cognitive semantic closure can 
afford (i.e. it is unlikely that non-cognitive semantic closure can observe the peculiar pulsing 
schedule described by dyson’s calculations), then we must instruct the cap-and-trade system 
with dyson’s pulsing-mode resource mobilization. in this way, we would be able to more cred-
itably demonstrate the superiority of brains over genes. as to when instruction of the cap-and-
trade system with dyson’s calculations is to be achieved, this action explicitly requires the de-
velopment of stasis technology. accordingly, awaiting this development, it has been suggested 
that daly’s SSe institutions be first employed to slow down world economic growth so that 
human civilization’s course may be safely charted according to the Kardashev nomenclature 
of civilization types.39
Slowing down world economic growth should help chart a safe course through the Karda-
shev nomenclature because it would reduce consumption stresses upon the natural environ-
ment and corresponding inequity stresses upon the social environment (i.e. because of the 
well-recognized trade-off between growth and equity). the Kardashev nomenclature recog-
nizes three civilization types: type i, type ii, and type iii. a type i civilization controls the 
resources of an entire planet. a type ii civilization captures the entire output of the star in its 
star system and therefore, by extension, controls the resources of an entire star system. (dyson 
himself has done the engineering studies for the capture of the energy output of an entire star 
through what has been appropriately termed the dyson sphere and concludes that it is defi-
nitely technically feasible.)  a type iii civilization controls the resources of an entire galaxy.40
We have not reached the status of a type i civilization yet, according to dyson, but shall 
probably do so in several centuries time—provided that ecological catastrophe does not over-
take us.41 to help avert such a possibility, dyson has suggested the genetic modification of eco-
systems while respecting ecological relationships so that natural ecosystems yield human necessities 
and wants (e.g. whatever chemicals we might need, including fuels) in addition to maintaining 
themselves in viable health. he concedes that the creation and nurturance of such a biologic 
industrial system might always remain an art rather than a science. he, however, considers 
that possibility just one more reason to opt for such a system.
the transition to a type ii civilization would, at a modest growth rate of one percent 
compounded annually, be achieved in 2500 years. it has been suggested that the instruction of 
daly’s SSe institutions with dyson’s pulsing mode resource mobilization be effected when we 
have achieved type ii status: not only would this schedule probably afford the appropriate 
time to develop stasis and other germane technologies, we would also need the resources of a 
type ii civilization to seed other star systems with colonies as a buffer against species extinction 
from truly catastrophic events, such as stellar gamma-ray bursts or supernovae explosions.
     38. dyson, “time without end: physics and biology in an open universe”,
     39. horacio Velasco, Sustainability: the matter of time horizon and semantic closure, Ecological Economics, 
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     40. Freeman dyson, Disturbing the Universe, london: pan books, 1981 [1979], p. 212.
     41. dyson, Disturbing the Universe, pp. 228-231.
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mention has been made of the necessity of respecting ecological relationships if we are to 
achieve type i status. Certainly helping in this regard is the control of population growth. this 
is explicitly recognized by daly when he includes as one of his SSe institutions one for control-
ling population growth. basically, this would work the same way as the cap-and-trade system 
for carbon dioxide emissions, with the difference that we would be working with birth permits 
rather than pollution permits. as well, the birth permits wouldn’t be auctioned off but rather 
freely given to the population. the permits are then yielded to government, along with proof 
of sufficient means of child-rearing support, when one desires to conceive progeny. people who 
violate this requirement would have their children put up for adoption. people who desire 
more children than the permits they have would warrant could purchase additional permits 
in the marketplace and people who don’t desire children could sell their permits. this system 
ensures that children are likely to be born to or raised with families that not only truly cherish 
them but also have adequate means to raise them. as concerns the total number of birth per-
mits to be allotted, this should be only what organic agriculture (i.e. agriculture that does not 
avail of fertilizers and chemical pest control) could sustain.
4. JuStiCe and CognitiVe SemantiC CloSure
in the previous section, we saw that sustainability, purely on the level of physics, demanded, as 
dyson himself explicitly articulated, that “questions related to the ultimate meaning and pur-
pose of life” be raised. this is exactly what nonlinear dynamics, with the primitive hysteresis 
associated with it, would indicate since it tells us that the future cannot be built up through re-
peated iterations of short-term choices. rather, the entire future must instruct what our choices 
in the short-term must be. this, we can only do if we are clear what purpose the future is to 
serve, at least, nay, of necessity at the most fundamental level allowing the greatest elaboration, 
over time. that purpose, if the future is to serve any purpose at all, can only be sustainability 
since without sustainability the existence of the future cannot be guaranteed. Sustainability, in 
agreement with dyson’s seminal investigations, has been defined as meeting the needs of the 
present without sacrificing the needs of the future (i.e. the entire future, as dyson’s calculations 
indicate). the future therefore exercises restraint on the claims and choices of the present and 
in so doing the present achieves safe passage into the future. Sustainability therefore demands 
a complementarity between the future and the present, a complementarity achieved through 
cognitive semantic closure: the macrolevel or collective purpose of sustainability is imposed, 
through the appropriate social institutions and their associated implements, upon microlevel or 
individual purposes so that these achieve compatibility with sustainability and therefore survive 
into the future through consequent semiotic hysteresis.
Sustainability, as defined above, clearly has a core element of justice conceived of as fair-
ness. dyson’s physics of resource mobilization upholds it. Justice as fairness, however, was also 
the position arrived at by the purely philosophical investigations of the philosopher, John rawls. 
as we shall see, chronological time through the irrevocable choices made in semiotic hysteresis 
and even nonlinear dynamical hysteresis (both cases of historical contingency), also played a 
key role in rawls’ determination of justice as fairness. to complement the findings of dyson’s 
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physics of resource mobilization that sustainability demands justice as fairness, we now turn to 
rawls’ philosophical investigations to further impress the convergence of ethics and technics 
when sustainability is concerned. in so doing, dyson’s and rawls’ investigations receive recip-
rocal support from one another and bolster the mutual security of their foundations.
it is to John rawls, in his A Theory of  Justice (harvard university press, 1971) that we owe 
the first systematic inquiry of our obligations to future generations.42 (Subsequently, inevitably, 
rawls would further qualify his thoughts in A Theory of  Justice through such books as Political 
Liberalism [Columbia university press, 1993] and Justice as Fairness [harvard university press, 
2001]). of rawls achievement, philosopher, daniel dennett, had this to say: “rawls’ theory 
has received, and deserved, more attention than any work of ethics in this [20th] century.” of 
the nature of rawls’ theory, dennett tells us this: “rawls presents a thought experiment about 
what, if it did happen, would be right. rawls’ project … is an entirely normative project: an at-
tempt to demonstrate how ethical questions ought to be answered, and, more particularly, an 
attempt to justify a set of ethical norms”.
the though experiment dennett adverts to is termed the original position (op).43 the 
op is a hypothetical, ahistorical meeting of all generations possible to the human species.44 in 
rawls’ own words as he concludes Theory of  Justice, to see our place in society from the op “ ‘is 
to see it sub specie aeternitatis: it is to regard the human situation not only from all social but also 
all temporal points of view’ ”.45 elsewhere in Theory of  Justice, rawls writes:  “each aspect of the 
original position can be given a supporting explanation. thus, what we are doing is to combine 
into one conception the totality of conditions which we are ready upon due reflection to recog-
nize as reasonable in our conduct towards one another.” (it may seem ironic that an ahistorical 
meeting of generations is required to address problems of historical contingency; however, a 
little thought suffices to persuade that, in fact, only by stepping out of history, as it were, could 
we make adjustments to contingencies or accidents of circumstance constituting history.) thus, 
rawls’ op, as with dyson’s calculations, demands consideration of the entire sequence of gen-
erations possible to the human species, albeit dyson’s calculations, on a purely pragmatic level 
and not on the level of justice as an idealization, considers only all future generations.
 in this op, the members of every generation are to operate behind what rawls calls a “ 
‘veil of ignorance’ ”. this veil of ignorance obscures from the members of each generation their 
historical, social, and genetic circumstances. thus, they do not know to which generation they 
belong or what their social status is within each generation; nor do they know their genetic gifts 
or afflictions. only behind this veil of ignorance, rawls argues, could and would we truly care 
about what features human society is to exhibit if it is to render justice. 
among those features that rawls considers are the social means (e.g. political and legal 
rights, leisure and independence, wealth and income) and resources that each generation 
would have to work with in their pursuit of the worthwhile life, however that life is conceived. 
     42. lukas meyer, “intergenerational Justice”, Stanford Encyclopedia of  Philosophy, 2008, section 4.4. http://
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     43. daniel C. dennett, Darwin’s Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meanings of  Life. new york: touchstone, 
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     44. See meyer, “intergeneration Justice”, section 4.4.
     45. Samuel Freeman,  “original position”, Stanford Encyclopedia of  Philosophy, 2008, section 8.
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(Such pursuit is  a major motive in the decisions of the parties to the op.) in the ideal case as to 
the allocation of those social means and resources, rawls concludes (in subsequent qualifica-
tions of his thoughts in a A Theory of  Justice) that it would have to be a conservation or savings 
principle such that “ ‘the members of any generation (and so all generations) would adopt as 
the one their generation is to follow and as the principle they would want preceding genera-
tions to have followed (and later generations to follow), no matter how far back (or forward) in 
time’ ”. accordingly, this principle of  just savings thus agreed on is to be binding for all previous 
and future generations.
to implement his just savings principle, rawls envisions two stages of social development. 
there would first be an accumulation stage in which the allocation of resources to the current 
generation compatible with just allocation to future generations is achieved. (this resonates 
with the disclosed recommendation in the previous section that daly’s SSe institutions only be 
instructed with dyson’s calculations after we have achieved type ii status in the Kardashev 
nomeclature of civilization types.) the next stage is what rawls calls the steady-state stage. 
this stage is attained when the appropriate social institutions are established. the previous 
section discloses that rawls was in error here: What rawls should have said was the pulsing-
mode stage in the sense described in the section. 
rawls stresses in his theory the minimum amount of available resources (along with other 
primary social means) if the parties to the op are to be able to make rational choices: al-
though, they may not even have knowledge, in the op, of the good that they want to pursue in 
life, guided by the available resources and primary social means that are available to them or 
which they possess, they can still make rational choices.46 that those rational choices are likely 
to be just is underscored by comparing rawls’ thick veil of ignorance and the utilitarians’ thin 
veil of ignorance. (mainstream, neoclassical economics, it should be noted, is utilitarian in its 
thrust.)
For utilitarians, the particulars of everyone’s circumstances are known and are taken as 
givens. the justice of these particulars is not questioned. rather, what happiness is possible 
from these particulars is to be maximized in the aggregate or in the average because we do 
not know our particular identities (this ignorance then constitutes the thin veil of ignorance). 
by contrast, rawls’ thick veil of ignorance deprives one of  knowledge of both one’s personal 
identity and personal circumstances (e.g. as to social status, historical situation, genetic gifts). 
these particular circumstances are therefore not taken as givens we have to work with. they 
may be questioned as to their justice. deliberations behind rawls thick veil of ignorance on 
the justice of these particulars may then aid in the construction of the appropriate social insti-
tutions that would indeed guarantee justice relative to particular circumstances for everyone 
in every generation (or at the least, all remaining generations) by ameliorating the injustice of 
those particular circumstances.
rawls argues above that for rational behavior operating towards justice behind the thick 
veil of ignorance in the op to be possible, a minimum of resources and primary social means 
must be available to each member of each generation. What is the decision procedure for de-
ciding that minimum that rawls advocates? Without benefit of dyson’s seminal calculations, 
     46. Freeman,  “original position”, section 3.
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rawls advocated a maximin decision rule.47 that is to say, he wants to ensure that the least ad-
vantaged members of society, in whatever generation, should have the resources and primary 
social means available to them maximized. the maximin rule is to be chosen because the ex-
ercise of choice (behind the thick veil of ignorance in the op) concerning what the nature of 
society is to be, is not subject to renegotiation or repetition; further, that choice determines all 
future prospects for the individual (i.e. semiotic hysteresis achieved through cognitive semantic 
closure embodied in the appropriate social institutions).   
how does one defend the choice of the maximin decision rule for the op against the 
bayesian statistical charge of its irrationality for most scenarios involving uncertainty? it is true 
that, for most decision contexts involving maximal uncertainty, the maximin decision rule is ir-
rational since statistical independence of circumstances counsels equiprobability of contingent 
personal circumstances. one would, therefore, logically favor maximizing average utility (i.e. 
happiness, satisfaction) over minimum utility. however, those decision contexts involve “future 
opportunities to recoup  potential losses and choose gain.” those opportunities are absent from 
the op because the moral choices involved from that position are irrevocable (they hold in 
perpetuity). to put it another way, the bayesian statistical objection is only valid if we operate 
in an atemporal or dynamical time rather than in temporal or chronological time. therefore, 
the necessity of the maximin rule if justice is to be served and responsibility discharged. as the 
physical chemist and nobel laureate, Wilhem ostwald, eloquently put it: “ ‘the responsibility 
for every act has sense only if the act cannot be repeated, if what is done is done forever’.”48
that the distinction between historical and dynamical time must be made absolutely clear 
to instruct one’s arguments about intergenerational justice is revealed in the work of another 
philosopher, derek parfit, eminent in this sphere of inquiry. i refer in particular to what parfit 
has called the repugnant conclusion (rC). the rC holds that any decline in the quality of life of 
population could and would, other things remaining equal and supposing that the decline in 
quality of life still leaves life worth living (even though barely), be compensated for by an in-
crease in population.49 in other words, parfit is arguing that the increase of total utility in a pop-
ulation (i.e. number of people multiplied by their satisfaction), supposing his presuppositions 
are granted, would compensate for decline in quality of life. as the description itself suggests, 
the rC is a conclusion that parfit (as well as many others scholars and academics) do not like.
the most natural way to avoid the rC is, of course, simply to challenge the assumption 
of “all other things remaining equal” (i.e. to recall, this is the ceteris paribus assumption of 
the neoclassical economists in their destructive affirmation of dynamical time). the distinc-
tion between historical and dynamical time certainly authorizes this challenge. historical time 
means irrevocable qualitative transformations, as the discussion on strong sustainability in the 
previous section implied. Strong sustainability therefore demands quantitative restrictions be 
imposed on natural and man-made capital. Such restrictions, through the appropriate social 
institutions instructed by dyson’s resource mobilization physics (daly’s SSe institutions, for ex-
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ample), should avoid parfit’s rC.
if, as argued above, the maximin decision rule is to be implemented to secure justice, then 
certainly an important aspect that decision rule must address is the  limitation of income dif-
ferentials within each generation (therefore, the importance of inheritance taxes, at least ini-
tially): purchasing power for the individual is more a function of relative rather than absolute 
income.50 thus, if your neighbor earns four times as much as you do, increasing both your 
incomes by a factor of three would leave your relative purchasing powers unaltered. if an im-
provement in your purchasing power is to transpire, it is required that the factor increase in 
your income exceed that of your neighbor’s. thus, your income might increase by a factor of 
three whereas your neighbor’s increases only by a factor of two. accordingly, the prescription 
in section 3 of a social institution for limiting income differentials, initially in the context of a 
steady-state economy (SSe) as conceived by daly, which SSe is subsequently switched to puls-
ing mode according to dyson’s calculations.
in this regard of limiting income differentials, minimum income should be able to afford 
food, clothing, shelter, basic health and education. maximum income might be placed at ten 
times minimum income since evidence from the military and the civil service shows that this 
income differential is able to generate sufficient incentive such that all jobs are filled volun-
tarily.51 limiting income differentials through minimum and maximum limits is also likely to 
lessen wealth accumulation: Why accumulate and maintain wealth (if this is at all possible from 
the limited income) from which you are unable to derive income anyway? Still, limitations on 
wealth might deserve further study.52 
the salutary effects of limiting income differential to fostering justice and community is 
articulated by daly amplifies as follows: 
unlimited inequality is inconsistent with community, no matter how well-off the poorest 
are. even relative poverty breeds resentment, and riches insulate and harden the heart. 
Conviviality, solidarity, and brotherhood weaken with economic distance. political power 
tends to follow relative income and cannot be allowed to concentrate too far in either a 
theocracy or a democracy without leading to plutocracy.53
achieving a limitation of income differential might be had through a combination of negative 
income taxes (i.e. subsidies to low incomes, say, from progressive and resource transforma-
tion taxes) and/or a universal basic income (ubi).54 a ubi  (advocated by Van parijs, among 
others) is “an income paid by a government, at a uniform level and at regular intervals, to each 
adult member of society.” it is income fixed at a certain level that is paid “whether the person is 
rich or poor, lives alone or with others, is willing to work or not.” it may apply (indeed, in most 
versions it does) to include, not only citizens, but permanent residents as well. the characteriza-
tion “basic” does not mean that the ubi is necessarily expected to meet “basic needs” (the ubi 
may be well below subsistence or well above it); all it means is that it is income that a person can 
rely upon whatever his circumstances.
     50. robert h. Frank and philip J. Cook, The Winner-Take-All Society, new york: the Free press,1995, p.14.
     51. See daly, Beyond Growth, p.210.
     52. daly, Beyond Growth, p.212.
     53. daly, Beyond Growth, p.214.
     54. philippe Van parijs, “a basic income for all”, Boston Review, october/november, 2000.
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the fundamental authorization for the ubi as being due to the operation of historical 
(rather than dynamical) time is given by Van parijs in his answer to those who object that the 
ubi is “undeserved good news for the idle surfer”: as Van parijs retorts, providing the idle 
surfer with a ubi 
is ethically indistinguishable from the undeserved luck that massively affects the 
present distribution of wealth, income, and leisure. our race, gender, and citizenship, 
how educated and wealthy we are, how gifted in math and how fluent in english, 
how handsome and even how ambitious, are overwhelmingly a function of who our 
parents happened to be and of other equally arbitrary contingencies. not even the most 
narcissistic self-made man could think that he fixed the parental dice in advance of 
entering this world. Such gifts of luck are unavoidable and, if they are fairly distributed, 
unobjectionable. a minimum condition for a fair distribution is that everyone should be 
guaranteed a modest share of these undeserved gifts. nothing could achieve this more 
securely than a ubi.55
Van parijs wants to make clear that he does not mean to deny “the importance of work and the 
role of personal responsibility” with his advocacy of the ubi. his motive, rather, is to provide 
reasoned, ethical defenses against (thanks to the anglo-Saxon economic hegemony) “a fashion-
able political rhetoric that justifies bending the least advantaged more firmly under the yoke.” 
in so doing, he wishes to persuade us that there is more justice to “everyone being entitled to an 
income, even the lazy” than to “everyone being entitled to a vote, even the incompetent.” 
the limitation of income differential by the ubi and negative income taxes in a pulsing-
mode economy that does not grow (i.e. increases production or consumption) but develops (im-
proves the nature of the capital stock towards serving the public good) is indispensable because, 
not being a growing economy, paying jobs will likely not be available for all, perhaps even the 
majority. is this something to be lamented, however? a growing economy is one that sacrifices 
equity and maximizes profit. as daly argues:
if automation and offshoring of jobs results in more of the total product accruing to capital 
(that is, the businesses and business owners profit from the product), and consequently 
less to the workers, then the principle of distributing income through jobs becomes less 
tenable. a practical substitute may be to have wider participation in the ownership of 
businesses, so that individuals earn income through their share of the business instead of 
through full-time employment.56
additionally, the enforced leisure imposed by a pulsing-mode economy should give people the 
incentive to become more civilized in the sense astutely discriminated by Clarke as the ability 
to be happily occupied for a lifetime even if one did not work for a living.57 
5. meaning and SemiotiC hyStereSiS
the role of chronological time, in the sense of semiotic hysteresis initially achived by non-
     55. philippe Van parijs, “a basic income for all”, Boston Review, october/november, 2000.
     56. daly, herman e. 2005. “economics in a Full World.” Scientific American, September, pp. 100-106, p.106.
     57. arthur C. Clarke, profiles of the Future: an inquiry into the limits of the possible, london: pan books 
ltd. iSbn: 0030697832,1973, p. 177.
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cognitive semantic closure and subsequently by cognitive semantic closure, in the sustaina-
ble propagation of indefinitely evolving complexity and justice was discussed in the preceding 
three sections. in this section we see that semiotic hysteresis is also intimately related, nay, sine 
qua non for the possibility of meaning to life.
to assemble the argument for this thesis, it may be well to begin with the varieties of happi-
ness that positive psychology has discriminated.58 these are three: a pleasant life; eudaemonia; 
and meaning. a pleasant life simply corresponds to acquiring as many of the positive emotions 
as you can manage, along with the skills for amplifying them. “there are a half dozen such 
skills that have been reasonably well-documented.” this is the “hollywood view of happiness” 
as exemplified by a giggling debbie reynolds. that this is not the only kind of happiness is 
readily disclosed by even a superficial reading of history: thinkers “from aristotle through 
Seneca through Wittgenstein” looked upon a mere pleasant life as rather vulgar. as stated 
above, at least two other kinds of happiness (with “very good intellectual provenance”) are pos-
sible that would be more welcome to these thinkers.
eudaemonia, the good life, is the sort of happiness that thomas Jefferson and aristotle 
would have advocated. eudaemonia does not consist in copious smiles and giggles or refer to 
“thrills”, visceral feeling uninstructed by thought, or “orgasms”. rather, eudaemonia consists in 
such things as  “aristotle talks about”: such things as “the pleasures of contemplation and the 
pleasures of good conversation”. When one is in a state of eudaemonia, it is as if “time stops” 
and you merge with the music. there is a liberation from self-consciousness and a feeling of 
being “completely at home.”
 to achieve eudaemonia, one wants flow. this means identifying “what your signature 
strengths are and then recrafting your life to use them more.” that is to say, you want “your 
work, your romance, your friendships, your leisure, and your parenting to deploy the things 
you’re best at.” When you do this, the result is not more giggles in your life but more flow. 
in connection with the signature strengths to be identified to achieve eudaemonia, Selig-
man (the originator of positive psychology) and his colleagues conducted “a  70-nation study” 
which yielded “a classification of strengths and virtues”. this classification disclosed “six virtues 
…endorsed across cultures, and these break down into 24 strengths.” the six virtues included 
the following: “first, a wisdom and knowledge cluster; second, a courage cluster; third, virtues 
like love and humanity; fourth, a justice cluster; fifth a temperance, moderation cluster; and 
sixth a spirituality, transcendence cluster.” the study suggests that these six virtues are about as 
fundamental to “human nature as walking on two feet are.” 
an example of “recrafting your life” to achieve flow and eudaemonia is afforded us by 
Seligman. he relates that he worked with a bagger at a store. She didn’t like her job. Seligman 
asked her to take the signature strengths test and it emerged that her highest strength was social 
intelligence. accordingly, she consciously “recrafted her job to make the encounter with her the 
social highlight of every customer’s day.” obviously, many of her customers didn’t see it as she 
intended it. however, “by deploying the single thing she was best at, she changed the job from 
one in which time hung heavy on her hands into one in which time flew by.” 
     58. martin Seligman,  “eudaemonia, the good life”, 2004. http://www.edge.org/3rd_culture/
seligman04/seligman_index.html
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how truly fundamental eudaemonia is to a happy life or even simply, to life itself, is also 
impressed upon us by Seligman when he relates to us a story involving one of his undergradu-
ate teachers, Julian Jaynes—who he characterizes as “a peculiar but wonderful man.” he was 
a research associate in princeton when Seligman was an undergraduate there. according to 
Seligman, some people characterized Jaynes as a genius, but Seligman didn’t know him well 
enough to be able to judge. as for the story, Jaynes was “given a South american lizard as a 
laboratory pet.” Jayne’s problem was that “no one could figure out what” the lizard ate. ac-
cordingly, the lizard was dying. 
So, as the story goes, Jaynes came in one day. the lizard  lay in the corner, in torpor. Jaynes 
was having ham on rye for lunch and he offered some of it to the lizard. the lizard would have 
none of it. Jaynes read the New York Times. Without thinking about it, he put the first section 
down on top of the ham on rye. Seeing “this configuration”,  the lizard “got up on its hind legs, 
stalked across the room, leapt up on the table, shredded the new york times, and ate the ham 
sandwich.” So we see that even “lizards don’t copulate and don’t eat unless they go through the 
lizardly strengths and virtues first.” if creatures as relatively simple as lizards have to experience 
eudaemonia to lead a healthy and happy life, then this argues so do we.
as for the third type of happiness—meaning—this may be considered an extension of eu-
daemonia to the social sphere. that is, you want to deploy your strengths in the service of a col-
lective larger than yourself that serves not only your interest (achieving flow) but others as well. 
Seligman gives the example of a lawyer. a lawyer can either be in his profession just to make 
money; or he can be in it to further “good counsel, fairness, and justice.”
a problem with meaning as a form of happiness, Seligman, concedes is that it doesn’t dis-
tinguish between good and evil. as Seligman instructs us, if meaning simply consists in “joining 
and serving in things larger than you that you believe in while using your highest strengths”, then 
there is no distinction between suicide bombers and the firemen who try to save the victims of 
the suicide bombers. both lead  meaningful lives, albeit one may be characterized as evil and the 
other as good.
Clearly, if the concept of a meaningful life cannot distinguish between good and evil deeds, 
then there is something objectionable about it. a possible way of resolving this problem, as sug-
gested by the previous sections would be the imposition of an indefinite time horizon to instruct 
our present interests. that indefinite time horizon would encompass, at the least, all future human 
generations, or, as in rawls’ op,  deployed as a normative artifice for distilling universally valid 
principles of justice (in conjunction with his “veil or ignorance”), all human generations.
how merely extending our time horizon to the unlimited future may temper our  deci-
sions and actions towards expunging evil and malice is suggested by  this argument from daly: 
the further we look into the future, then the more likely it is that we, in the present generation, 
are potential co-progenitors of a common descendant according to the retroactive algorithm 
2n (where n is the number of previous generations). accordingly, to the extent that we care 
about our remote descendants, then we should also care for our contemporaries. this fact, 
daly argues, gives us an additional reason to care for our contemporaries and gives the lie to 
the common charge that “concern for the future” weakens ethical concern for more pressing 
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problems of present injustice.59
daly points out, however, that caring for our remote descendants, due to increasing ano-
nymity of kinship, is in the nature of a public good and must therefore be addressed through 
collective arrangements or institutions. he also points out that because care for our remote 
descendants is a public good, the conclusion reached by mainstream economists that “the re-
vealed public will” is “that the future beyond two generations should carry no weight in present 
decisions” because “people usually take no action and show little interest in their own descend-
ants beyond their grandchildren” is a fallacious one.
rawls’ op  and his veil of ignorance should also exert a restraining influence in the invest-
ment of meaningful lives with evil intent. to recall, the op is an imagined ahistorical meeting 
of all human generations and the veil of ignorance may be taken to mean as the unpredictable 
and irrevocable hand of contingency in assigning to us to the conditions of our lives (including 
which generation we live in). the conjunctive operation of these two conditions means that we 
do not know our fate in life. accordingly, it would be hard to harbor evil intent against others 
because the consequences of those evil intent might well fall on ourselves. 
the foregoing discussion clearly shows the literally decisive role played by chronological time 
in exercising ethical choice. it offers support for and is reciprocally given support by the judgment 
of the british astrophysicist, arthur Stanley eddington, when he wrote: “ ‘in any attempt to bridge 
the domains of experience belonging to the spiritual and physical sides of our nature, [chronologi-
cal] time occupies the key position’ ”.60 by contrast, the denial of the ability to exercise any choice 
at all, let alone ethical choice, by those who reject chronological or historical time in favor of dy-
namical time is plainly disclosed by this confession from a neoclassical economic theorist:
[neoclassical economists] naturally tended to think of models in which things settle 
down to a unique position independently of initial conditions. technically speaking, we 
theorists hoped not to introduce hysteresis phenomena into our model, [thereby taking] 
the subject out of the realm of science and into the realm of genuine history.61
a technical way chronological time helps to foster meaning in human lives on its largest 
scale through historical time may be seen through the metaphor afforded us by symbolic dy-
namics (i.e. the hybrid discipline from the union of information theory and dynamical systems 
theory) about how meaningful messages are generated from symbols.62 Symbolic dynamics 
teaches us that this requires two conditions, at the least: 1.) the symbols involved must exhibit 
a preferential direction in space. thus, english only makes sense when read from left to right; 
arabic only makes sense when read from right to left; and the genetic code only makes sense 
when read in a fixed direction from a start point. 2.) it must be impossible, “in all nontrivial 
cases”, to infer the message from a sequence of symbols, however large a segment of the se-
quence we possess. the message should only emerge after reading the entire sequence. thus, 
the books worth reading are those that demand being read in their entirety and not those with 
     59. herman e. daly, “postscript: unresolved problems and issue for Further research”, in: Energy, 
Economics, and the Environment: Conflicting Views of  an Essential Interrelationship, herman e. daly and alvaro F. 
umaña (eds), boulder, Colorado: Westview press (1981): 165-185, pp. 177-178. 
     60. See prigogine, The End of  Certainty, p.59.
     61. See mirowski, “From mandelbrot to chaos in economic theory”, p.291.
     62. See nicolis and prigogine, Exploring Complexity, p.186.
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conclusions we can infer without having read all their pages.
meaning in our lives therefore requires the predictive opacity imposed by uncertainty over 
historical time. as the heterodox economist, nicholas georgescu-roegen, has noted of this 
opacity, it results from the fact that the “needs generated by evolution” are often so subtle that 
we are seldom aware of their “influence upon our complex activity”, if we are even aware of 
their existence at all. in consequence, only after the fact “do we realize why we labored and 
what we searched for” and subsequently affirm “with ostwald Spengler that ‘a task that his-
toric necessity has set will be accomplished with the individual or against him’ ”.63
georgescu-roegen was therefore entirely correct in praising this predictive opacity and 
the meaning it affords the human condition when he wrote: 
With a life span amounting to no more than a blink of a galaxy and restricted within a 
speck of space, mankind is in the same situation as a pupa destined never to witness a 
caterpillar crawling or a butterfly flying. the difference, however, is that the human mind 
wonders what is beyond mankind’s chrysalis, what happened in the past and, especially 
what will happen in the future. the greatness of the human mind is that it wonders: he 
‘who can no longer pause to wonder and stand rapt in awe’—as einstein beautifully put 
it—‘is as good as dead’. the weakness of the human mind is the worshiping of the divine 
mind, with the inner hope that it may become almost as clairvoyant and, hence, extend 
its knowledge beyond what its own condition allows it to observe repeatedly.64
it seems therefore that even infinite beings, if there be such (certainly we cannot exclude this 
possibility as it lies in the realm of theology where, as per the distinctions made by the philoso-
pher, Karl popper, propositions are unfalsifiable and therefore non-testable and non-scientific), 
have cause to envy finite beings such as ourselves. it may even be, if they have caused our exist-
ence, that the reason they have done so was to experience, in their immanent aspects (through 
us), what they cannot, in their transcendent aspects: meaning.
this necessity of historical time if meaningful lives are to be had may  be complementa-
ry  impressed through the resulting existential pain that comes only with preoccupation with 
present conditions (that is, by being instructed only by dynamical time). this existential pain is 
certainly attested to by author, bryan appleyard, when he writes:
   i am born and i shall die and, in between, these visions are what they most obviously 
are: mine. this is the only timespan i have and the only one in which my virtue and 
purpose may be found. i choose not to be written into some history of the future or 
beguiled by the technological demands of the as-yet unborn. …
Such an avowal means the end of the rule of science because it denies the infinite open-
endedness and willingness to change that science needs for the continued invasion of 
our souls. it also means an insistence that my soul be put back where it belongs—in 
my body—rather than in the remote realm to which, 400 years ago, science consigned 
it. this realization alone may not make that soul immortal, nor will it promise me an 
afterlife or salvation. So you may say it leaves me exactly where i was before—mortal, 
suffering, and as lost as ever. i will reply that there is one vital difference: i shall not be, 
     63. See georgescu-roegen, The Entropy Law, p.27.
     64. georgescu-roegen, The Entropy Law, p.207.
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at the last, alone. 65
that is bitter and empty solace indeed: “community” in death.
Why preoccupation with present conditions alone should lead to such existential pain is 
given psychological explanation by Skinner as follows:
one of the great problems of individualism, seldom recognized as such, is death--the 
inescapable fate of the individual, the final assault on freedom and dignity…[t]he 
individualist has a special reason to fear death, engineered not by a religion but by the 
literatures of freedom and dignity…he has refused to be concerned for the survival of 
his culture and is not reinforced by the fact that the culture will long survive him. in the 
defense of his own freedom and dignity he has denied the contributions of the past and 
must therefore relinquish all claim upon the future.66    
in other words, the existential pain has to do, as asserted before, with the denial of the affinity 
of the living condition with chronological or historical time rather than with dynamical time.
6. ConCluSion
it is an acknowledged commonplace that people whose choices are motivated only by imme-
diate reward (choices often associated with sociopaths) do not prosper and are apt to have lives 
that are, to quote hobbes, “short, nasty, and brutish.” What is not generally known, let alone ac-
knowledged, is that wider society too, whether capitalist, communist, or socialist, by looking only 
at finite time spans in the future in their collective aspirations, have been essentially motivated by 
short term gain as well. in effect, therefore, human affairs on this planet is directed by dynamical 
time. this is why we find ourselves in our present predicament, with the very ability of the planet 
to support life impaired and obfuscated from our awareness by its treatment as an external cost 
(rather than a central cost) by capitalist, mainstream, neoclassical economics (with its global he-
gemony); as well by the fact that it is in the nature of nonlinear dynamical transitions (as of a beam 
failing) that we seem to be doing okay until we take that final step, to the point of no return. 
if we are to repair this ultimately lethal state of affairs, it will be necessary to embrace the 
indefinite future through cognitive semantic closure, thereby displacing dynamical time with 
the chronological time (in the sense of semiotic hysteresis) in which the living condition has 
evolved (of necessity, initially through non-cognitive semantic closure). the deliberate exercise 
of cognitive semantic closure through the social institutions described in this paper (with their 
associated implements and as instructed by dyson’s seminal calculations) may be the first un-
ambiguous demonstration of the superiority of brains over genes since it was brains that uncov-
ered the resource mobilization schedule that permits the perpetuation of life into virtual infinity. 
Supposing the indefinite perpetuation of life, that superiority would further be bolstered in the 
quality of life yielded: one of justice and meaning as the claims of the future restrain the claims 
of the present, thereby shaping and filtering those present claims into choices which, through 
their selection and consequences, essentially project as non-tautological messages through the 
communications channels of chronological time: semiotic hysteresis.
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